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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the distributional implications of mandatory longevity insurance when
there is mortality heterogeneity in the population.  Previous research has demonstrated the
significant financial redistribution that occurs under alternative annuity programs in the presence
of differential mortality across groups.  This paper embeds that analysis into a life cycle framework
that allows for an examination of distributional effects on a utility-adjusted basis.  It finds that the
degree of redistribution that occurs from the introduction of a mandatory annuity program is
substantially lower on a utility-adjusted basis than when evaluated on a purely financial basis. In a
simple life-cycle model with no bequests, complete annuitization is welfare enhancing even for
those individuals with much higher-than-average expected mortality rates, so long as administrative
costs are sufficiently low.   These findings have implications for policy toward annuitization,
particularly as part of a reformed Social Security system.
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  Most public pension systems combine elements of redistribution and insurance.  For 
example, the U.S. Old Age Survivors Insurance program (OASI) uses a non-linear benefit 
formula that provides a higher replacement rate for lower income workers in an effort to make the 
system progressively redistributive.  At the same time, OASI insures individuals against longevity 
risk through the provision of benefits in the form of life annuities.   
For some types of risk, providing insurance and engaging in progressive redistribution 
are complementary activities.  This is true, for example, with Disability Insurance.  In the U.S., 
workers covered by the DI program are provided with insurance against income loss in the event 
of becoming disabled.  Because individuals who are disabled have, by definition, diminished 
earnings capacity, this same program serves a progressively redistributive role.  Even on an ex 
ante basis, if lower wage individuals have a higher probability of becoming disabled, then a 
disability insurance program would even redistribute from higher to lower income individuals in 
expectation.     
For other types of risk, however, the provision of insurance can have regressive 
distributional effects.  Longevity risk is one such case.  In a life-cycle setting, individuals who do 
not know how long they will live are, in general, made better off by annuitizing their wealth.  
However, because high-income individuals have longer life expectancies, they will have a higher 
expected present value of annuity payments than will low income individuals, if everyone is 
required to annuitize at a uniform price as in most public pension plans.       
There is a large literature focusing on measuring the insurance value of annuitization for 
representative life-cycle consumers (e.g., Mitchell, et al 1999, Brown 2001).  These papers 
generally quantify the utility gains from access to actuarially fair annuity markets by finding how 
much incremental, non-annuitized wealth would be equivalent to providing access to an 
actuarially fair annuity market (sometimes called the “annuity equivalent wealth”).  A standard 
result from this approach is that a 65-year old male with log utility, whose mortality expectations 
mirror that of the population average, would find annuities equivalent in utility terms to a 50%   2
increase in wealth.  With few exceptions, however, these utility-based calculations have been 
conducted only for “average” consumers who have access to annuities that are actuarially fair, 
i.e., that are priced using the individual specific mortality rates.  Little has been done to examine 
the utility implications of annuitizing in an environment of heterogeneous mortality.
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The contribution of this paper is to examine the distributional impact of alternative 
annuity designs in a framework that incorporates the utility value of the longevity insurance.  In 
particular, it examines how the annuity equivalent wealth varies across socioeconomic groups 
when annuities are priced uniformly.  Staying with the no bequest assumption, this approach 
provides answers to three types of questions.  First, under what conditions are individuals, 
particularly those in high-mortality risk groups, made better off by annuitizing at a uniform price?  
Second, how much redistribution is there on a utility-adjusted basis?  Third, how are the answers 
to the first two questions affected by alternative annuity designs?  For example, would individuals 
with shorter life expectancies prefer constant real annuities or some other path of payments?  
This approach yields several interesting findings.  First, in the absence of administrative 
costs, uniform priced annuities can make all life-cycle consumers better off, even those with 
mortality rates that are substantially higher than those used to price the annuity.  Second, the 
amount of redistribution that arises from mandatory annuitization is much smaller on a utility 
adjusted basis than on a financial basis.  Third, even high mortality risk individuals generally 
prefer real annuities to nominal ones, despite the fact that nominal annuities “front-load” annuity 
payments and thus provide, in expectation, higher lifetime payments to these short-lived 
individuals.    
                                                           
1 There is a related literature examining the distributional effects of the current U.S. Social Security system 
(e.g., Gustman & Steinmeier 2001, Liebman 2000, Coronado, Fullerton & Glass 2000), and a smaller but 
growing literature examining redistribution within an individual accounts system (e.g., Brown 2000, 
Feldstein & Liebman 2000).  However, these analyses have focused on purely financial measures of 
redistribution, as opposed to the utility-based measure used in this paper.   
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These findings are relevant to the debate about how to reform the U.S. Social Security 
system.  Mortality differentials can have a significant effect on the progressivity of mandatory 
annuitization schemes, including most public pension systems.  Several recent papers have 
suggested that the progressivity of the OASI benefit formula, which provides a higher 
replacement rate for lower wage individuals, is at least partially offset by the fact that higher 
income individuals tend to live longer than lower income individuals (Gustman & Steinmeier 
2001, Liebman 2000, Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass 2000, Cohen, Steuerle & Carasso 2001).  
While these studies differ in the degree of overall progressivity in the system, all of them find that 
mortality differentials contribute to a lessening of income-based redistribution.   
Many commentators have expressed concern that supplementing or partially replacing the 
current Social Security system with a program of personal accounts would have regressive 
distributional implications.  In particular, if there is no redistribution elsewhere in the program 
(such as in contribution rates or benefit offsets), then there will be no offset of any distributional 
effects that arise from mortality heterogeneity in the payout phase.  For example, if all individuals 
were required to annuitize their retirement accounts at a uniform price upon reaching age 67, the 
expected present value of future annuity payments would be substantially smaller for individuals 
with higher mortality probabilities, even if the account balances were identical in size.  This paper 
demonstrates that these redistributive effects are substantially mitigated when evaluated on a 
utility-adjusted basis, and that the gains from annuitization are significant even for groups with 
high mortality rates.  
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 provides a review of the literature on why 
annuities are valuable to representative retirees. Section 2 presents evidence on the interaction 
between mortality and socioeconomic status using data from the National Longitudinal Mortality 
Study, and discusses the impact of this on financial measures of distribution.  Section 3 uses a 
simplified, two-period model to provide intuition for how the utility value of an annuity is 
affected by differential mortality.  Section 4 discusses the dynamic programming methodology   4
for solving for annuity valuation in a multi-period problem with liquidity constraints.  Section 5 
reports dynamic programming simulation results of the annuity equivalent wealth for multi-
period life cycle individuals with more realistic constraints on annuity payments.  Section 6 
concludes.      
 
1.  The Insurance Value of Annuitization 
In a widely cited article, Yaari (1965) demonstrated that a risk averse, life-cycle 
consumer facing an uncertain date of death would find actuarially fair annuities of substantial 
value.  In fact, under certain conditions, including the absence of bequests and the absence of 
other sources of uncertainty, life cycle consumers find it optimal to invest 100% of wealth into 
actuarial notes.  More recent theoretical work indicates that annuities are often welfare enhancing 
in a broader set of cases than those allowed by Yaari, including in the presence of aggregate risk, 
adverse selection, and intertemporal non-additivity of the utility function (Davidoff et al 2001).  
Other extensions, such as allowing for precautionary savings and bequest motives, tend to reduce 
the value of annuitization.     
Annuities derive their value from the elimination of longevity risk.  In the absence of 
annuities, individuals facing an unknown date of death must allocate their wealth across an 
uncertain number of periods.  Unless the individual lives to the maximum lifespan, following the 
optimal consumption path will result in the individual dying with positive financial wealth.  
Assuming the individual does not value bequests, the individual would have been better off, ex 
post, had she consumed more each period while alive.  Ex ante, however, following a more 
aggressive consumption path would have exposed her to the risk of having very low consumption 
levels in the event that she lived longer than expected.  This problem arises in the absence of 
annuities because the individual is unable to allocate wealth in a state contingent manner.  
Instead, she must, for any given future period, set aside an equal amount of wealth for the state in   5
which she is alive, and thus values consumption, and the state in which she is dead and does not 
value consumption. 
Annuities partially complete the market by allowing an individual to make future 
resources survival-state contingent.  In particular, annuities allow the individual to increase the 
income available in future periods conditional on being alive, in return for accepting zero 
resources in the event that she dies.  If an individual has no bequest motive and therefore cares 
only about future states in which she is alive, this enables her to consume more each period while 
alive and completely eliminate the risk of living “too long” with resources insufficient to support 
desired consumption levels. 
Previous work indicates that for a 65-year old man with average U.S. population 
mortality and log utility, gaining access to an actuarially fair real annuity market is equivalent to a 
50% increase in wealth (Brown, Mitchell & Poterba, 2001).  However, all of these studies have 
assumed that individuals have access to annuity markets that are actuarially fair, i.e., that the 
annuity is priced according to each individual’s own mortality rates.  In most realistic policy 
settings, such as public or private pension systems, individuals with heterogeneous mortality are 
pooled into a common annuity market.  As such, very few individuals have access to annuities 
that are priced in a manner that is actuarially fair at the individual level, even if the system is 
actuarially fair on average.  As such, the utility gains from annuitization in such a setting will 
vary across individuals.             
2.  Mortality Heterogeneity and Annuity Prices 
There is substantial heterogeneity in expected lifetimes in the U.S. population.  In 
addition to differences by age and gender, it has been substantially documented that mortality 
rates are correlated with race (Preston et al 1996, Sorlie et al 1992), ethnicity (Sorlie et al 1993), 
income (Deaton & Paxson 2001), wealth (Attanasio & Hoynes 2000), marital status (Brown & 
Poterba 2001), and educational attainment (Kitawaga & Hauser 1972, Deaton & Paxson 2001, 
Lantz et al 1998).  In general, these correlations work in the direction that individuals of higher   6
socioeconomic status live longer than those in lower socioeconomic groups.  For example, whites 
live longer than blacks, higher income and higher wealth individuals live longer than individuals 
with less wealth, married people live longer than singles, and more highly educated individuals 
live longer than less educated individuals.  There is also controversial evidence suggesting that 
Hispanics live longer than whites in the U.S., though this appears to be more true for foreign born 
than U.S. born Hispanics, and may be due to data contamination. 
To evaluate the effect of mortality differentials on annuity valuation, it is necessary to 
construct a set of mortality tables that are differentiated based on demographic characteristics.  
This paper will use mortality estimates that are differentiated by age, gender, educational 
attainment, race and ethnicity.  Age and gender are obvious characteristics to condition on, given 
the near universal pattern of adult mortality rates rising with age and the fact that females have 
lower mortality rates than males.  
The level of lifetime financial resources available to an individual is clearly of policy 
interest in evaluating the distributional implications of annuity policy.  Unfortunately, solid 
measures lifetime resources are not always available to researchers.  One widely used measure is 
the current income of an individual or family.  Current income, however, is a poor measure of 
lifetime resources.  The most important criticism of this measure is the problem of simultaneous 
causation between income and health.  Low-income individuals are more likely to suffer from 
health problems and thus experience higher mortality rates.  But it is also true that individuals in 
poor health may be unable to earn a high income, in which case the causality is reversed. 
Another frequently used measure is wealth.  Attanasio & Hoynes (2000), Menchik (1993) 
and Palmer (1989) all provide compelling evidence that wealth and mortality are inversely 
correlated.  The use of wealth partially addresses the simultaneity problem that arises when using 
current income.  However, as noted by Attanasio & Hoynes, it cannot be considered exogenous 
either because wealth accumulation behavior of individuals with different life expectancies is 
likely different.   7
A third measure, and the one used in this study, is educational attainment.  A significant 
negative correlation between education and mortality has been well documented (Deaton & 
Paxson 2001, Lantz et al 1998, Kitawaga & Hauser 1973).  Education is a reasonable proxy for 
lifetime resources because more highly educated individuals have, on average, higher incomes.  
In addition, education is a pre-determined variable for most retired individuals.  These benefits, 
combined with the fact that in the data used here the income data is of poor quality and the wealth 
data is not available, is the primary motivation for using educational status as a measure of 
economic status. 
The primary motivation for examining results by race and ethnicity is that these measures 
are directly relevant to the politics of the Social Security debate in the U.S.  For example, the 
Interim Report of the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security specifically 
highlighted the impact of Social Security on African-Americans and Hispanics.  While no racial 
or ethnic group is monolithic, there is tremendous political interest in how racial and ethnic sub-
groups will fare under various proposals, as this could, in part, determine the viability of any 
reform effort.  Thus, the ability to examine the effect of annuity policy on racial and ethnic 
groups is relevant to public policy.  In addition, race and ethnicity serve as additional, albeit 
imperfect, proxies for economic status when combined with other measures such as educational 
attainment.  However, it is important to remember that the differences in mortality rates across 
racial and ethnic groups presented in this paper are not necessarily caused by racial and ethnic 
differences.  Rather, these differences likely reflect a combination of factors, including 
unobserved differences in economic status that are not conditioned out by the educational 
measures.  However, to the extent that one is interested in how racial and ethnic groups fare, on 
average, under various reform options, the measures presented below are quite useful.  
The group specific mortality differentials are estimated using data from the National 
Longitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS).  The NLMS is a survey of individuals who were 
originally included in the Current Population Survey and/or Census in the late 1970s and early   8
1980s.  Throughout the 1980s, death certificate information from the National Death Index was 
merged back into the survey data, allowing researchers to compare the death rates of individuals 
on the basis of demographic characteristics at the time of the interview.   
Age specific mortality rates are constructed from the NLMS for black, white and 
Hispanics males and females, a total of six groups. The white and black groups are then further 
differentiated based on education, less than high school, high school plus up to three years of 
college, and college graduates.  Due to small sample sizes, it is not possible to differentiate 
Hispanics along educational lines.   
Several steps are required to turn these NLMS estimates into cohort mortality tables for 
specific groups.  First, the NLMS sample is split into groups based on the gender, race, ethnic, 
and educational categories.  For each group g, the age-specific, non-parametric (np) mortality 
rate, q
np
x,g, is calculated as the fraction of those individuals age x who die before attaining age 
x+1.  This procedure provides a simple, non-parametric estimate of the age specific mortality rate 
for individuals with the characteristics of group g.   
In order to correct for non-monotonicity that occasionally arises due to small cell sizes in 
some populations, the non-parametric estimates, q
np
x,g, are treated as the independent variable in a 
non-linear least squares regression on age x.  The non-linear regression is used to estimate three 
parameters of a Gompertz/Makeham survival function, as explained in Jordan (1991).  The 
Gompertz/Makeham formula used is: 
x c x














x is age, and g, c, and s are the parameters to be estimated.  Note that if l0 is set equal to one, then 
lx is simply the cumulative survival probability to age x.  Using the NLLS estimates of g, c, and s, 
one then has a “Makeham formula” that gives mortality qx as a function of x.  Let us denote these   9
fitted values of mortality for group g at age x as q
fit
x,g.  An important feature of this approach is 
that fitted mortality rates are a monotonically increasing function of age x. It also allows one to 
create out-of-sample estimates of mortality.  Therefore, while only data from age 25 to 84 is used 
to fit the curve, the formula can provide estimates of mortality for ages outside of this range.  This 
model has been found to describe human mortality patterns quite accurately up to the age of 96 
(Riggs and Millecchia 1992).  It has, however, had difficulty accounting for mortality patterns 
among the very oldest individuals (Witten 1988, Riggs & Millecchia 1992).  Fortunately, the 
results in this paper are very insensitive to the mortality rates at these extreme old ages because 
the contribution of consumption to lifetime utility at these ages is being heavily discounted both 
by interest rates and mortality rates.  
  Once these predicted mortality rates are in hand, the next step is to convert them into 
cohort life tables for each group.  This requires two related assumptions.  The first is that the 
ratios of a group’s age-specific mortality to that of the population as a whole (qx,g/qx) in the 
NLMS sample is an accurate portrayal of these ratios in the full population in 1980.  The second 
assumption is that these ratios are constant over time.  By invoking these two assumptions, it is 
possible to then construct a group specific cohort life tables for any year.  
  Specifically, let q
fit
x,g be the fitted value of the mortality rate for an individual age x 
belonging to group g, and let q
fit
x be the mortality rate for an individual age x for the population 
as a whole, both from the fitted NLMS data.  Let q
SSA
x be the age-specific mortality rate from the 
1978 birth cohort table from the Social Security Administration, which represents individuals 
turning age 22 in the year 2000 (the group of study in this paper).  Then the cohort, group specific 
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  The one exception to this methodology is that in the case of college educated black males 
and females, the mortality ratio between college and high school is assumed to be the same for   10
blacks as for whites.  This ratio is applied to the fitted q’s for blacks with a high school education 
in order to construct the estimate for a college educated black.  This was done because the sample 
sizes at many ages were too small for college-educated blacks to reliably construct an 
independent estimate. 
Table 1 reports how the life expectancy of a 22-year-old in the year 2000 varies by the 
gender, race, ethnicity, and education as calculated using the above methods.  The average 22 
year old male can expect to live to age 77.4, while the average 22 year old woman can expect to 
live to age 83.4.  However, these estimates vary widely by race.  White, black, and Hispanic 22-
year old males have life expectancies of 78.3, 71.8 and 77.7 years respectively, while white, black 
and Hispanic females have life expectancies of 84.0, 80.0, and 85.2 years respectively.  Life 
expectancy at age 22 also varies substantially by education level.  White men with less than a 
high school education have a life expectancy at age 22 of 75.3 years, a full 5.2 years less than that 
of a white male with a college degree.  Low educated black males have by far the lowest age 22 
life expectancy of any group examined, at 68.1 years.  The highest life expectancy is college 
educated white women, who can expect to live to age 85.1.   
  Table 1 also reports the life expectancy as of age 67 for this same cohort.  As can be seen, 
there is still a substantial range in the estimates, although the differential in years is not as large as 
at age 22.  This is because much of the life expectancy difference that arises for 22 year olds is 
due to higher mortality probabilities in the pre-retirement period.  Conditional on reaching age 67, 
these differences are diminished.  The numbers suggest that a 67-year-old white can expect to live 
approximately 16 months longer than a 67-year-old black.  When further differentiating by 
educational attainment, the difference is naturally larger, with a 3.4-year difference between 
college educated white men and less than high school educated black men.     
The general racial and ethnic patterns in this data set are consistent with other sources of 
mortality patterns.  For example, the U.S. Census Bureau reports life expectancies at birth that are 
higher for Hispanics than for non-Hispanic whites, which in turn are higher than those for blacks.    11
It should be noted, however, that there is controversy about the nature of the mortality differences 
for Hispanics.  The limited research available suggests that U.S. Hispanics have lower mortality 
rates than non-Hispanic whites, despite a greater proportion living in poverty, lacking health 
insurance, and having more limited access to health care (Sorlie et al 1993).  Hispanics tend to 
have lower rates of heart disease, cancer and pulmonary disease, although these differences do 
not seem to be explained by the major known risk factors for these diseases.  There are reasons to 
be cautious in interpreting the Hispanic results.  First, if sampling techniques tend to under-
sample less healthy Hispanics (e.g. migrant workers), this would bias mortality rates down.  In 
addition, studies like the National Longitudinal Mortality Study obtain death statistics by linking 
to the National Death Index.  This means that deaths outside of the U.S. are not recorded, and 
thus some individuals’ deaths will be missed.  This is particularly likely to occur among 
immigrants to this country, some of whom may return to their country of origin at the end of their 
lives. A final reason that the Hispanic results should be interpreted cautiously is that there is very 
substantial heterogeneity in this population.  Of particular importance is the fact that foreign-born 
persons tend to have lower mortality risk than native-born persons (Sorlie et al 1993).  This 
“health migrant effect” would also help explain lower mortality rates among Hispanics. 
  One can use these mortality estimates to construct a “money’s worth” of an annuity that 
is priced based on the average mortality in the population.  A money’s worth measure is simply 
the expected present value of annuity payments per dollar spent to purchase the annuity, and has 
been used in many past studies of annuity prices (Friedman & Warshawsky 1988 and 1990, 
Warshawsky 1988, Mitchell et al 1999).  Table 2 reports the money’s worth ratio for the cohort 
entering the workforce in the year 2000.  This purely financial measure indicates that the money’s 
worth of an inflation indexed life annuity for a 67 year old black male with less than a high 
school education would be only 0.800, while a white woman with a college education would have 
a money’s worth of 1.106.  Viewed solely from this financial perspective, mandating 
annuitization at a uniform price is tantamount to a system of taxes and transfers that takes   12
resources from poorly educated black men and gives it to highly educated white woman.  This is 
due to the fact that an annuity, by design, serves to transfer resources from shorter-lived to 
longer-lived individuals, combined with the fact that there is heterogeneous mortality in the 
population.   
Brown (2000) explores the money’s worth of a richer set of annuity options, and finds 
that the dispersion in money’s worth across groups can be substantially reduced by considering 
annuities that “front-load” annuity payments or offer bequest options.  As reported in Table 2, an 
annuity that declines in real value by 3% per year increases the money’s worth for low educated 
black men to 0.83.  Even more striking, offering an annuity with a 20-year period certain 
guarantee
2 increases the money’s worth to black men with less than a high school education to 
0.955, as indicated in column 3.   
  The money’s worth, however, is purely a financial measure, and as such it ignores the 
insurance value that individuals derive from the elimination of longevity risk.  To assess the 
welfare effect of differential mortality, it is necessary to embed the heterogeneous mortality into a 
utility-based model. 
3.  Annuity Valuation with Heterogeneous Populations 
Previous studies have used an “annuity equivalent wealth” measure to quantify the gains 
from actuarially fair annuitization.  Intuitively, the annuity equivalent wealth is a dollar measure 
of how much value an individual places on access to an annuity market.  It is closely related to 
the measure of “equivalent variation” used in standard welfare analysis.  It proceeds by asking the 
question “what increment to and individual’s wealth would make that person as well off as if she 
had access to an actuarially fair annuity market?”  For a given lifetime utility function, this is 
calculated first by finding the utility level associated with full annuitization of the individual’s 
wealth.  One can then calculate how much additional wealth would be required to attain this same   13
level of utility in the absence of annuitization.  This annuity equivalent wealth measure uses the 
full annuitization utility level as its baseline.  Alternatively, one could use the non-annuitized 
level of utility as a baseline, and then calculate how much wealth one could take away if access to 
annuities were provided and still leave the person at the same utility level.  This latter approach, 
sometimes called “wealth equivalence” (Mitchell et al 1999) is similar to the compensating 
variation measure in welfare analysis.  Both approaches lead to quite similar conclusions about 
the welfare gains of annuitization.  The annuity equivalent wealth measure has been used more 
often in previous studies due to a slight computational advantage, and is used here to make results 
more comparable to these other studies.
3          
To understand this approach analytically, it is useful to examine a much-simplified 
problem.  Consider a two-period model for a single consumer, with additively separable log 
utility of consumption, and the interest rate and time preference rate both equal to zero.  Let P be 
the probability that the individual will survive to period 2, and let φ  be the period 1 price of 
consumption in period 2.  Then the consumer’s problem is:   
{} 12
12 , ln ln
CC Max C P C +       ( 3 )  
subject to: 
W C C = + 2 1 φ       ( 4 )  





=            ( 5 )  
Note that if no annuities are available, φ =1, and the optimal consumption path is declining 
proportionally with the probability of survival.  If annuities are actuarially fair, then φ =P, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 A life annuity with a 20-year period certain guarantee means that the annuity will make a minimum of 20 
years worth of payments to either the insured or the named beneficiary.  If the annuitant is still alive at this 
point, payments continue for life, otherwise, the payments end. 
3 Readers interested in a more detailed discussion of these differences will find it in Brown, Mitchell, 
Poterba and Warshawsky (2001).     14
individual wishes to perfectly smooth consumption over the life cycle.  If annuities are available, 
but are more expensive than actuarially fair, then 1>φ >P, and consumption will decline at an 
intermediate rate. 
Solving (2) and (3) and plugging into (1), we find that the indirect utility function 
V(P,φ ,W) is: 




















P W P V ln
1
ln 1 , ,     (6) 
Denote the Annuity Equivalent Wealth as α , which is implicitly defined as: 
() ( ) W P V W P V , , , 1 , φ α =      (7) 
The left hand side of equation 7 is the utility level achieved when the individual does not have 
access to annuities, so that the price of second period consumption is equal to one, but has 
additional wealth.  The right hand side of equation 7 is the utility level achieved when an 
individual has access to an annuity with a price of φ .  The Annuity Equivalent Wealth, α , is a 
measure of the additional wealth that must be given to the individual in the absence of annuities 
to be as well off as if the individual could annuitize at a price of φ . 




 −  −  = .  Naturally, when no annuities are available, 













1 α .  For 
example, if φ =P=.5, then α =1.26, indicating that an individual would be indifferent between 
$1.26 of non-annuitized wealth, and $1.00 of annuitized wealth.  Therefore, access to actuarially 
fair annuity markets can be said to be worth a 26% increase in wealth. 
This highly simplified framework allows one to immediately see several stylized results.
4   
                                                           
4 Readers interested in a more general and more rigorous theoretical treatment of annuities will find it in 
Davidoff, et al, 2002.   15
Result 1: α >0 for all 0<P<1 and 0<φ <1.  So long as there are no additional administrative costs of 
annuitization, all consumers are made better off by annuitization.  Importantly, even if individuals 
with very short life expectancies are required to annuitize in a market where pricing is based on 
high survival probabilities (i.e., low P and high φ ), the annuity equivalent wealth exceeds 1.0.  
Thus, the oft-used assumption that annuities be priced actuarially fair is overly restrictive.  The 
intuition for this is straightforward – with no loading costs, the availability of annuities that are 
not actuarially fair for an individual still have the effect of reducing the price of future 
consumption for that individual, and thus making the consumer better off.   






.  Any individual with an uncertain lifespan values 
annuities more highly when they are priced using lower survival probabilities.  This is quite 
intuitive, since it simply states that all individuals are better off when the price of future 
consumption falls. 





.  For a fixed price, increasing an individual’s survival probability 
makes the annuity more valuable because they are more likely to survive to consume the annuity. 










.  When annuities are actuarially 
fair for each individual, increasing P from 0 to 1 has a positive and then negative effect on 
annuity valuation.  This is because a change in P now has two effects.  First, individuals with 
longer life expectancies (higher P) are more likely to survive to the second period and thus 
consume the annuity, which makes annuities more valuable.  Second, high P individuals must pay 
more for second period consumption, which makes annuitization less valuable.  These effects 
work in opposite directions, and thus a plot of α  against P is hump shaped.  In this simple 
example given here, the value of annuitization peaks at P=.278, a relatively low survival 
probability.  If we were to compare a cross-section of individuals, all of whom had a P>.278, we   16
would find that individuals with shorter life expectancies value individually priced annuities more 
highly than those with longer life expectancies!  This is in contrast to the intuition of result 2, 
which is the standard intuition about annuity valuation.  The reason for this result is that 
individuals with lower survival rates are rewarded with a lower price of consumption for the 
second period.   
In this two-period problem, P is a sufficient statistic for both the life expectancy (e.g., the 
mean) and the degree of longevity risk (e.g., higher moments).  When one moves to a multi-
period problem, life expectancy is no longer a sufficient statistic for how much mortality risk one 
faces, and therefore, for how much one values an annuity.  Life expectancy is an average, and the 
simple economics of risk suggests that the degree of uncertainty around the mean also matters.  In 
fact, it is possible for a person with a longer life expectancy to value an identical annuity less than 
someone with a shorter life expectancy.  For a trivial (and very hypothetical) example, consider a 
65 year-old man who knows he will live exactly 20 more years and die on his 85
th birthday.  This 
person has no risk to insure against, and the annuity is worth no more to him than the simple 
discounted value of the 20 years of payments.  If a second man has an identical 20-year life 
expectancy, but substantial risk around this mean, he will value the annuity more highly.  As 
such, there exists some ε >0 such that we can reduce this second person’s life expectancy to 20-ε , 
and still have a higher annuity equivalent wealth than the person who will live to 20 for sure, due 
to the uncertainty around this mean.  As such, it is not accurate to claim that an individual with a 
longer life expectancy will always value annuities more highly.  A multi-period model will be 
discussed in the next section. 
So far, we have been assuming that there are no mark-ups of price over marginal cost.  If 
there are mark-ups, such as in the form of administrative costs, the budget constraint in (4) can be 
rewritten as: 
12 CC W θ φ +⋅⋅ =       ( 8 )    17
where θ >1 for a positive mark-up.  This leads us to another straightforward result: 
Result 5:  If (θ⋅φ )>1, then α <1.  If administrative costs are high enough to completely offset the 
price reduction that arises from the mortality rates used to price the annuity, then this has the 
effect of making second period consumption more expensive, and annuities become less valuable.   
This two-period model is useful insofar as it builds some simple intuition for how the 
value of annuitization is related to the price of annuities, survival probabilities and administrative 
costs.  These results generally apply to multi-period models in which the individual has the ability 
to choose survival contingent consumption in each period separately, i.e., Arrow-Debreu markets 
are complete.  For example, if an individual finds that his own survival probabilities in some 
periods are higher than those used in the pricing of annuities, he would choose to consume more 
in those states.  In most “real world” annuity markets, however, the structure of annuity payments 
typically constrains one’s ability to do this.  For example, in the U.S. Social Security system, 
individuals are forced to annuitize in a constant real annuity, and are constrained against 
borrowing from future annuity payments.  They must therefore purchase units of consumption 
across periods in fixed proportions, and this means they are unable to precisely match the annuity 
to their preferred consumption profile.  When these constraints bind, this will have the effect of 
reducing annuity value.  Importantly, these constraints will have differential effects on groups 
with different mortality expectations.  Therefore, the differential utility impact of multi-period 
annuity contracts needs to be examined in a multi-period setting to determine if the basic results 
of the two-period model go through. 
4.  Multi-Period Annuity Valuation 
Calculating the Annuity Equivalent Wealth (α ) for more realistic, multi-period settings 
with constraints on the annuity payments can in some cases be solved in closed form.  Generally, 
however, the presence of liquidity constraints imposed by the annuity structure makes closed   18
form solutions difficult to obtain.  In such cases, one way to solve for the α  is to use dynamic 
programming techniques.   
To generalize the problem, let U(Ct) represent the one-period utility function defined over 
real consumption, ρ  the utility discount rate, and T the maximum possible life-span of an 
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where Pt is the probability of surviving to period t, subject to the following constraints: 
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In these constraints, Wt is non-annuitized wealth in period t, Ct is consumption, and At is 
the annuity payment that can be purchased when annuity markets are available.  Assume that the 
individual, prior to any annuitization, has financial wealth W
*.  Then for the case in which no 
annuities are available, W0= W
*, and At=0, ∀ t.  In the case in which the individual fully 
annuitizes all financial assets, then W0 = 0, and At is determined by the pricing in the annuity 
market.  For the special case in which the annuity is actuarially fair for the individual, At is 
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In equation (8), the real interest rate is represented by r, and the inflation rate by π .  Note 
that this formula determines the nominal value of a fixed nominal annuity.  The real value of this 
annuity declines by the factor 1/(1+π ) each period.  By setting π =0, equation (3) can be used to 
determine the starting value of a real annuity as well.  In the simulations that follow, it will be 
assumed that r=ρ =.03.  By replacing the individual’s Pj with the average Pj for the annuitizing   19
population, we can construct the annuity payments available in a uniform price system.  It is also 
straightforward to incorporate administrative loading costs into the calculation by multiplying the 
right-hand side of equation 11 by one minus the load factor. 
In order to use dynamic programming techniques to solve for the optimal consumption 
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subject to the constraints in equation (10).  
The value function at time t is the present discounted value of expected utility evaluated 
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where qt+1 is the one period mortality probability, i.e., the probability of dying in period 
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The Bellman equation reduces the full maximization problem to a series of 2-period 
problems that can be solved numerically by solving back from the final period.  This 
maximization is subject to the constraints in equation (10).  I use standard methods of discretizing 
the wealth space to closely approximate the solution.   
To calculate α , the Annuity Equivalent Wealth, one must first find the maximum utility 
V
* for the case in which the individual has the ability to fully annuitize W
*
.  Because this 
individual fully annuitizes, he starts off with zero non-annuitized wealth, W0 = 0.  One then solves 
for the case in which annuities are not available.  That is, At is constrained to be zero for all t.  It 
is then possible to solve for the amount of additional wealth, ∆ W, which must be given to the 
individual in the absence of annuities such that the utility without annuities is equal to V
*.     20
That is, ∆ W is defined such that: 
  V(W
*+∆ W | At = 0, ∀ t) = V
*                      (15) 
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5.  Results 
  The Annuity Equivalent Wealth is calculated for individuals retiring at age 67, which is 
the Normal Retirement Age that the existing U.S. OASI system is transitioning towards.  The 
cohort chosen for this study is that which enters the workforce at age 22 in the year 2000.
5  
Results are quite similar for other cohorts.  Within this cohort, we consider the mortality 
differentials across the gender, racial, ethnic and education groups described in section 2.  While 
it is true that individuals in these demographic groups may enter retirement with substantially 
different levels of wealth, the CRRA utility function used in the simulations is invariant to the 
scale of wealth and therefore the annuity equivalent wealth measure, which is stated as a 
percentage of initial wealth, is unaffected by the differences in wealth levels across groups.   
The value of annuitization is, however, related to the degree of risk aversion.  In 
particular, more risk averse individuals will value annuities more highly than less risk averse 
individuals.  While there is some evidence that risk aversion differs across segments of the 
population (Eisenhower & Halek forthcoming, Barsky, et al 1997), it is difficult to pin down these 
differences in a precise manner.  Therefore, annuity equivalent wealth values are reported for all 
demographic groups for CRRA coefficients one through five.  A risk aversion of one corresponds 
to log utility, a value that is often found to be the average risk aversion in many studies of 
consumption (Laibson, Repetto, & Tobacman 1998).  Higher levels of risk aversion have been 
                                                           
5 This is a cohort that has been used in several other studies of Social Security reform (Feldstein & 
Ranguelova 2000, Brown 2000).   21
found in other studies, particularly those examining the equity premium puzzle, and thus annuity 
equivalent wealth results are reported for higher levels as well. 
  Table 3 reports the annuity equivalent wealth for the case of a constant real annuity that is 
uniformly priced for all individuals.  There are several aspects of these numbers that are worth 
noting.  First, as has been found in previous studies focusing on representative individuals, the 
utility gains from annuitization are quite high.  Focusing on average men, the annuity equivalent 
wealth ranges from 1.35 at log utility to 1.546 for a risk aversion coefficient of 5.  Second, even 
poorly educated black men, those with the worst mortality prospects of all the groups represented, 
have an annuity equivalent wealth of 1.296 when evaluated using log utility.  Thus, even though 
the money’s worth calculation indicates that poorly educated black men receive negative transfers 
on the order of –20% from being required to annuitize at a uniform price, the utility gains are still 
substantial.  Third, as expected, annuity valuation is rising with risk aversion for all individuals.   
Fourth, there is a surprising lack of significant dispersion in the annuity equivalent wealth 
figures across demographic groups.  The largest effects are between men and women.  With log 
utility, the difference between the utility gain to average women and that to average men is 11.5% 
of wealth.  This should be contrasted with the 15.6% difference when evaluated on purely a 
financial basis in Table 2.  This difference shrinks to only 4.2% of wealth at risk aversion of 5.  
Within genders, there is very little difference.  For example, the difference in annuity equivalent 
wealth of college educated white men and less than high school educated black men is only 6.5% 
of wealth when risk aversion is 1, and only 1.2% of wealth when risk aversion is 5.  Again, this 
stands in stark contrast to the results when reported on purely a financial basis, where the 
difference in money’s worth between these two groups was 16.7% of wealth.   
  These results may seem somewhat surprising given that the financial transfers are so 
large.  It is important to realize, however, that much of the utility value of annuitization comes 
from the fact that it eliminates the risk of running resources down to a very low level in the event 
that one lives longer than expected.  Even high mortality risk groups have a non-zero probability   22
of living to advanced ages, and the utility gains from avoiding states of low consumption are 
quite large.  In the absence of annuitization, the optimal consumption path requires a high-
mortality risk individual to set aside money for the low probability event that he will lived to be 
age 100.  In most cases, this money will be “wasted,” since the individual is likely to die much 
earlier and, in this model, does not value bequests.    
  As an interesting comparison, annuity equivalent wealth results are next computed for the 
case in which annuities are priced for each demographic group on an actuarially fair basis.  In 
other words, the annuity is “risk-class” priced, so groups with lower mortality rates receive lower 
annuity payments.  From a financial perspective, the money’s worth for every group is equal to 
one.  Table 4 reports the difference in annuity payouts that arise under this pricing assumption.  
Note that the monthly payment ranges from a low of $553.08 for college educated white women, 
to a high of $776.92 for black men with less than a high school education.   
Table 5 indicates that high mortality risk individuals value actuarially fair annuities far 
more highly than low mortality risk individuals.  For example, with a risk aversion coefficient of 
one, a black male with less than a high school education has an Annuity Equivalent Wealth of 
1.632, meaning that gaining access to actuarially fair annuity markets is equivalent to a 63.2% 
increase in non-annuitized wealth.  This represents a doubling of the 32.1% increase in wealth for 
a college educated white female, despite the fact that the payments are only 40% higher.  Once 
again, at higher levels of risk aversion, the annuity equivalent wealth rises for all demographic 
groups.  At a risk aversion coefficient of 5, for example, the annuity equivalent wealth ranges 
from a low of 1.435 to a high of 1.929.   
Results thus far suggest several interesting conclusions.  First, even in an environment in 
which annuities are uniformly priced, if administrative costs are zero, all consumers are made 
better off by availability of the annuity.  Second, while the degree of redistribution appears large 
when measured on a financial basis, the degree of redistribution when measured on a utility-
adjusted basis is substantially smaller.  Third, if annuities are not uniformly priced, but rather are   23
priced based on the mortality experience of each risk class, the high mortality risk groups benefit 
the most from annuitization.   
  High mortality risk groups experience a low money’s worth due to the fact that they are 
less likely to be alive in future periods to consume the annuity payments.  As such, as was shown 
in table 2, they are better off from a financial perspective if the annuity is declining in real terms.  
This is because a declining real annuity front-loads payments into early periods, when the 
individual is more likely to be alive.  As was also demonstrated in section 2, if an individual’s 
mortality rate is higher than that used in the pricing of annuities, he will prefer a consumption 
path that with a downward tilt.  Fixing annuities in nominal terms and letting inflation erode its 
real value over time is an example of a product that would provide such a downward slope.  Table 
6 reports annuity equivalent wealth results for the case of an annuity that declines at a real rate of 
3% per annum.  This rate is roughly consistent with the average historical rate of inflation in the 
U.S.  Comparing the results from table 6 with those of table 3 (constant real annuities), it is clear 
that most individuals are made worse off by having the annuity decline in real terms.  In fact, for 
risk aversion of 2 or greater, every group is better off with constant real annuities.  Only in the 
case of log utility is any group made better off by declining annuities, and one might expect, these 
are high mortality risk groups.  Specifically, whites with less than a high school education, and 
black men of all education levels, are the only groups to do better under a declining real annuity 
with log utility.  While the dispersion in annuity equivalent wealth does decrease, thus decreasing 
the amount of redistribution, it does so mainly by depressing the value of annuities for most 
groups, rather than raising it for many.  It should also be noted that these are results for a 
declining real annuity.  A true nominal annuity that is subject to inflation risk would lower 
annuity values for everyone.  Thus, from a utility standpoint, it seems that front-loading payments 
through imperfect inflation indexing is not a satisfactory way to handle distributional concerns.  
Another option for lessening the degree of financial redistribution is the period certain 
guarantee.  For example, an annuity contract that is for “life plus 20 years certain” pays off the   24
longer of 20 years or the insured’s life.  Period certain guarantees, usually 10 or 20 years, are 
commonly attached to life annuity products.  In the context of the present utility-based valuation 
model, in which the insured individual is assumed not to value bequests, a period certain product 
would not be optimally chosen.  Nonetheless, given their popularity, I report results for a 20 year 
period certain product in table 7.  As one would expect, the overall valuation of the annuity is 
lower for all households for the simple reason that a life plus 20-year period certain product has 
lower payouts than a straight life annuity.  If one does not value a bequest motive, then the use of 
a period certain payout operates like a load factor,
6 reducing the payouts with no corresponding 
utility benefit.  As such, the annuity is equivalent to only an increase in non-annuitized wealth of 
between 8 and 18 percent, depending on the degree of risk aversion.  Consistent with earlier 
estimates, however, the degree of dispersion across groups is remarkably small.   
    All of the above results assume that annuities do not have any additional costs, i.e., that 
they are actuarially fair for the average annuitant.  However, it is unlikely that annuities can be 
provided with no administrative costs.  For example, private annuity markets in the U.S. are 
estimated to have administrative costs of approximately 8% (Mitchell, et al 1999).  Table 8 shows 
annuity equivalent wealth results for the case of a uniform price, constant real annuity with 8% 
administrative costs.  Not surprisingly, all the annuity valuations fell relative to table 3 by 
approximately 8%, and the basic finding that there is limited redistribution on a utility-adjusted 
basis still holds. 
7.  Conclusions 
Annuities provide valuable longevity insurance to individual with uncertain lifetimes.  
However, mandating that all individuals annuitize at a uniform price also has distributional 
implications.  When measured on a financial basis, these transfers can be quite large and often 
away from economically disadvantaged groups and towards groups that are better off financially.  
                                                           
6 Under the assumption of a 3 percent real interest rate and a 3 percent inflation rate, and using the unisex 
mortality tables, the switch from a straight life annuity to a life + 20 year certain annuity reduces the annual   25
This paper indicates, however, that the insurance value of annuitization is sufficiently large that, 
relative to a world with no annuities, all groups can be made better off through a mandatory 
annuitization system, so long as administrative costs are kept low.  In particular, even groups with 
mortality rates far higher than those used to price the annuities are made better off than in the 
absence of annuities.  Furthermore, there appears to be far less redistribution when evaluated on a 
utility adjusted basis. 
These results are based on a counterfactual world in which no annuities are available.  
This is not as extreme a counterfactual as it may at first appear, given that outside of Social 
Security and some defined benefit plans, annuity markets in the U.S. are quite thin (Brown et al 
2001).  It is important to note, however, that the distributional consequences of mandating 
annuitization in an individual accounts system, for example, will differ depending on the 
counterfactual.  If, for example, individuals are already fully annuitized in a system that prices 
annuities uniformly, then moving to a system of individual accounts that does the same thing will 
not have any new distributional effects arising from annuitization (though differences may still 
arise from other features of the system).  If individuals are already annuitized in a system that 
prices annuities separately for each demographic group, then the move to a uniform priced 
annuity system would clearly represent a shift in resources away from high risk individuals to low 
risk individuals.  The story becomes even more complex if, in the counterfactual world, annuities 
are available on a voluntary basis only, and at high cost (a fair representation of the individual 
annuity market in the U.S.)  Mandating annuitization can raise the average payout rate by forcing 
individuals into the market, improving the welfare of those who had been annuitizing previously.  
It would also improve the welfare of those that would have liked to annuitize but did not due to 
the cost structure.   
  It should also be noted that a full social welfare comparison of alternative annuity 
systems would require the specification of an explicit social welfare function.  Recent work by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
payout by approximately 18 percent.   26
Sheshinski (1999) demonstrates conditions under which uniform annuity pricing can in fact be 
social welfare maximizing, and conditions under which it is not.     
  This paper has focused exclusively on longevity insurance.  One potentially fruitful area 
for future research would be an investigation of the utility value of other insurance aspects of 
public pension systems, such as disability, survivor and dependent benefits.  To the extent that 
these programs have substantial insurance value, previous studies of the distributional effects of 
Social Security that have ignored this value may not tell the complete story about the 
distributional effects of social insurance programs.   
Future research could also extend the annuity valuation framework to include bequest 
motives.  While the economics profession is far from a consensus about the importance of 
bequests or how to model them, additional work would be useful for understanding the value of 
annuities with bequest options.    
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TABLE 1 
Conditional Life Expectancy by Gender, Race, Hispanic Status, and Education 
 
Conditional Life Expectancy 
 at age 22 
Conditional Life Expectancy 
 at age 67 
 
Men Women  Men  Women 
       
All  77.4  83.4 83.5 87.2 
       
All  Whites  78.3  84.0 83.6 87.4 
All  Blacks  71.8  80.0 82.3 86.1 
All  Hispanics  77.7  85.2 84.8 88.3 
       
Whites:  College +  80.5  85.1  84.4  87.8 
Whites:  HS +  77.8  83.9  83.4  87.3 
Whites:  < HS  75.3  82.1  82.3  86.5 
       
Blacks:  College +  75.7  81.9  83.4  86.8 
Blacks:  HS +  71.6  80.0  82.2  86.1 
Blacks:  < HS  68.1  77.5  81.0  85.1 
  
Notes:  “Conditional Life Expectancy” is used to describe the age to which an individual can expect to live, 
conditional on attaining age 22 or 67. 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text. 
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TABLE 2 
Money’s Worth of Annuities 
 
 Real  Annuity 
r = .03 
Nominal Annuity 
r = π  = .03 
Real Annuity with 20-
year Period Certain 
MEN     
  All  0.920  0.938  0.972 
      
  All Whites  0.927  0.944  0.973 
  All Blacks  0.862  0.886  0.964 
  All Hispanics  0.988  0.998  0.980 
     
  Whites:  College +  0.967  0.980  0.978 
  Whites:  HS +  0.916  0.934  0.973 
  Whites:  < HS  0.865  0.889  0.964 
      
  Blacks:  College +  0.916  0.935  0.970 
  Blacks:  HS +  0.857  0.881  0.964 
  Blacks:  < HS  0.800  0.830  0.955 
      
WOMEN     
  All  1.076  1.059  1.026 
      
  All Whites  1.084  1.067  1.027 
  All Blacks  1.022  1.011  1.018 
  All Hispanics  1.123  1.097  1.042 
      
  Whites:  College +  1.106  1.086  1.030 
  Whites:  HS +  1.080  1.063  1.027 
  Whites:  < HS  1.044  1.031  1.022 
      
  Blacks:  College +  1.055  1.041  1.023 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.022  1.011  1.018 
  Blacks:  < HS  0.976  0.970  1.011 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text  
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TABLE 3 
Annuity Equivalent Wealth Under Uniform Pricing 
 
  CRRA=1 CRRA=2 CRRA=3 CRRA=4 CRRA=5 
MEN       
  All  1.350  1.449  1.497  1.527  1.546 
       
  All Whites  1.352  1.450  1.498  1.528  1.546 
  All Blacks  1.328  1.437  1.488  1.522  1.542 
  All Hispanics  1.362  1.449  1.495  1.523  1.543 
        
  Whites:  College +  1.361  1.452  1.498  1.527  1.546 
  Whites:  HS +  1.351  1.451  1.499  1.529  1.548 
  Whites:  < HS  1.325  1.434  1.486  1.520  1.540 
       
  Blacks:  College +  1.343  1.443  1.492  1.523  1.542 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.328  1.437  1.488  1.523  1.543 
  Blacks:  < HS  1.296  1.415  1.472  1.511  1.534 
       
WOMEN       
  All  1.465  1.531  1.560  1.577  1.588 
       
  All Whites  1.465  1.531  1.560  1.577  1.588 
  All Blacks  1.459  1.529  1.560  1.577  1.588 
  All Hispanics  1.487  1.545  1.570  1.585  1.597 
         
  Whites:  College +  1.466  1.530  1.559  1.576  1.588 
  Whites:  HS +  1.465  1.531  1.561  1.577  1.588 
  Whites:  < HS  1.463  1.531  1.562  1.578  1.589 
       
  Blacks:  College +  1.462  1.530  1.560  1.577  1.588 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.459  1.529  1.561  1.577  1.588 
  Blacks:  < HS  1.453  1.526  1.560  1.577  1.587 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text 
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TABLE 4 
Monthly Income from $100,000 Policy if Priced Based on Group Specific Mortality 
 
 Monthly  Income 
 Men  Women 
    
All $675.36  $577.36 
    
All Whites  670.42  572.90 
All Blacks  720.83  608.15 
All Hispanics  629.12  553.08 
    
Whites:  College +  642.73  561.83 
Whites:  HS +  678.25  575.13 
Whites:  < HS  718.40  595.19 
    
Blacks:  College +  678.22  589.01 
Blacks:  HS +  725.13  608.01 
Blacks:  < HS  776.92  636.84 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text 
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TABLE 5 
Annuity Equivalent Wealth with Actuarially Fair Risk Class Pricing 
 
  CRRA=1 CRRA=2 CRRA=3 CRRA=4 CRRA=5 
MEN       
  All  1.471  1.578  1.633  1.665  1.688 
       
  All Whites  1.462  1.568  1.622  1.653  1.675 
  All Blacks  1.548  1.675  1.737  1.774  1.799 
  All Hispanics  1.381  1.469  1.515  1.544  1.563 
        
  Whites:  College +  1.409  1.504  1.553  1.582  1.601 
  Whites:  HS +  1.479  1.587  1.643  1.674  1.697 
  Whites:  < HS  1.539  1.666  1.728  1.766  1.791 
       
  Blacks:  College +  1.470  1.578  1.635  1.668  1.691 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.557  1.686  1.748  1.786  1.810 
  Blacks:  < HS  1.632  1.783  1.859  1.900  1.929 
       
WOMEN       
  All  1.359  1.421  1.499  1.465  1.476 
       
  All Whites  1.349  1.410  1.437  1.454  1.464 
  All Blacks  1.427  1.496  1.527  1.543  1.553 
  All Hispanics  1.318  1.372  1.396  1.410  1.419 
       
  Whites:  College +  1.321  1.380  1.408  1.424  1.435 
  Whites:  HS +  1.354  1.416  1.443  1.460  1.470 
  Whites:  < HS  1.399  1.466  1.495  1.512  1.521 
       
  Blacks:  College +  1.384  1.449  1.478  1.495  1.505 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.426  1.496  1.526  1.543  1.553 
  Blacks:  < HS  1.489  1.565  1.599  1.615  1.629 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text 
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TABLE 6 
Annuity Equivalent Wealth Under Uniform Pricing 
Nominal (Declining Real) Annuity 
 
  CRRA=1 CRRA=2 CRRA=3 CRRA=4 CRRA=5 
MEN       
  All  1.350  1.419  1.441  1.446  1.447 
       
  All Whites  1.351  1.419  1.440  1.446  1.447 
  All Blacks  1.339  1.419  1.441  1.447  1.446 
  All Hispanics  1.353  1.411  1.434  1.444  1.449 
        
  Whites:  College +  1.354  1.416  1.438  1.445  1.449 
  Whites:  HS +  1.351  1.421  1.442  1.447  1.447 
  Whites:  < HS  1.338  1.418  1.441  1.447  1.446 
       
  Blacks:  College +  1.346  1.416  1.439  1.446  1.447 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.340  1.420  1.442  1.447  1.446 
  Blacks:  < HS  1.321  1.414  1.439  1.449  1.445 
       
WOMEN       
  All  1.408  1.441  1.447  1.448  1.450 
       
  All Whites  1.408  1.441  1.447  1.448  1.450 
  All Blacks  1.409  1.444  1.477  1.448  1.451 
  All Hispanics  1.417  1.443  1.448  1.448  1.450 
       
  Whites:  College +  1.406  1.439  1.477  1.449  1.449 
  Whites:  HS +  1.408  1.441  1.447  1.448  1.450 
  Whites:  < HS  1.410  1.443  1.447  1.448  1.451 
       
  Blacks:  College +  1.408  1.442  1.447  1.448  1.451 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.409  1.444  1.447  1.448  1.451 
  Blacks:  < HS  1.409  1.445  1.446  1.448  1.451 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text 
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TABLE 7 
Annuity Equivalent Wealth Under Uniform Pricing 
Life Annuity with 20-Year Period Certain Guarantee 
 
  CRRA=1 CRRA=2 CRRA=3 CRRA=4 CRRA=5 
MEN       
  All  1.105  1.159  1.175  1.181  1.179 
       
  All Whites  1.106  1.159  1.175  1.180  1.179 
  All Blacks  1.096  1.160  1.175  1.182  1.180 
  All Hispanics  1.105  1.152  1.170  1.177  1.178 
        
  Whites:  College +  1.107  1.156  1.173  1.179  1.178 
  Whites:  HS +  1.106  1.161  1.176  1.181  1.179 
  Whites:  < HS  1.094  1.159  1.174  1.182  1.180 
       
  Blacks:  College +  1.101  1.157  1.173  1.181  1.179 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.096  1.161  1.175  1.182  1.181 
  Blacks:  < HS  1.082  1.155  1.174  1.183  1.183 
       
WOMEN       
  All  1.150  1.176  1.179  1.179  1.181 
       
  All Whites  1.150  1.175  1.179  1.179  1.181 
  All Blacks  1.151  1.177  1.180  1.179  1.180 
  All Hispanics  1.157  1.177  1.179  1.179  1.181 
       
  Whites:  College +  1.149  1.174  1.179  1.179  1.180 
  Whites:  HS +  1.151  1.176  1.179  1.179  1.181 
  Whites:  < HS  1.151  1.177  1.180  1.179  1.181 
       
  Blacks:  College +  1.150  1.1776  1.180  1.179  1.181 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.151  1.177  1.181  1.179  1.180 
  Blacks:  < HS  1.150  1.178  1.182  1.180  1.180 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text 
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TABLE 8 
Annuity Equivalent Wealth Under Uniform Pricing with 8% Load Factor 
 
  CRRA=1 CRRA=2 CRRA=3 CRRA=4 CRRA=5 
MEN       
  All  1.243  1.332  1.380  1.407  1.426 
       
  All Whites  1.245  1.333  1.381  1.408  1.427 
  All Blacks  1.223  1.320  1.373  1.402  1.421 
  All Hispanics  1.254  1.333  1.377  1.405  1.424 
        
  Whites:  College +  1.252  1.335  1.381  1.408  1.428 
  Whites:  HS +  1.244  1.334  1.382  1.409  1.428 
  Whites:  < HS  1.221  1.318  1.371  1.400  1.419 
       
  Blacks:  College +  1.237  1.326  1.375  1.403  1.423 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.223  1.321  1.374  1.403  1.421 
  Blacks:  < HS  1.194  1.303  1.359  1.392  1.411 
       
WOMEN       
  All  1.349  1.410  1.438  1.455  1.465 
       
  All Whites  1.349  1.410  1.438  1.455  1.465 
  All Blacks  1.343  1.410  1.438  1.455  1.466 
  All Hispanics  1.368  1.423  1.448  1.462  1.470 
       
  Whites:  College +  1.349  1.409  1.437  1.453  1.464 
  Whites:  HS +  1.349  1.411  1.438  1.455  1.466 
  Whites:  < HS  1.347  1.412  1.439  1.456  1.467 
       
  Blacks:  College +  1.346  1.410  1.438  1.455  1.466 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.343  1.410  1.438  1.455  1.466 
  Blacks:  < HS  1.337  1.408  1.437  1.455  1.465 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text 
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